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The Status Issue, Political Challenges and the
Path to European Integration
The report was drafted by M. Kullashi and B.
Pula, with contributions from other board members
of Forum 2015: Sh. Maliqi, M. Mustafa and Dukagjin
Pupovci.
Source: Kosova's Scientist's Institute
INTRODUCTION
This report has been prepared in the current
atmosphere of renewed diplomatic and political
momentum focused on the question of Kosova’s
status, amid growing prospects that Kosova may in
the near future join the EU family of states
alongside its regional neighbours. It outlines
some key political challenges that the political
process will have to address, and provides
arguments why the solution, which is important not
just for Kosova itself but for the whole region -
must be the recognition of Kosova as an
independent state. Independence is essential for
Kosova’s economic and social development, and also
in order to create proper foundations for the
process of stability and integration that will
eventually lead the Balkan states into the
European Union.
Accordingly, the report provides arguments from
many perspectives as to why independence is the
most rightful, pragmatic and sustainable solution
- for Kosova and Serbia alike. It also addresses
various concerns and counter-arguments regarding
the future of an independent Kosova, and in this
context explains why suggested alternatives to
independence would not work. The authors are
convinced that uncertainty surrounding Kosova’s
future status, if prolonged in any form, would
merely serve to perpetuate elements of the current
status quo that have already produced, and would
continue to produce, all-round negative effects.
If the core problems are not addressed, the
massive investments the international community
has made in Kosova and the region could be put at
risk.
The issue of Kosova’s status is rightly seen by
Western diplomats and policy-makers as one of the
most complicated problems in the Balkans, but also
one that it is crucial to solve if sustainable
peace and stability in the region are to be
ensured. Nevertheless, after the deployment of
NATO troops in Kosova and the withdrawal of
Serbian forces in 1999, the international
community hesitated to address the status issue
openly. Their vacillation and lack of resolve
(especially in the case of certain EU countries)
contrast sharply with the plebiscitary demand for
independence of Kosova’s Albanians and non-Serb
minorities, representing over 90% of the
population. This legitimate demand enjoys support
from many Western political centres, inluential
international organizations and independent
political analysts and scholars. In addition, a
number of prominent Serbian politicians too have
voiced their support for a more realistic position
on the part of the Belgrade government, given
Serbia’s evident inability to re-assert its
control over Kosova(1).
The assessment of this report is that now is the
decisive moment to resolve the question of
Kosova’s status, in order to do away with an
insecurity and ambiguity that can only produce
negative effects upon Kosovaitself, upon Serbia
and upon the entire region. The authors are well
aware that recognizing Kosovaas an independent
state is no simple matter for the international
community; but they also believe that no other
solution is viable. They further argue that
Kosova’s independence would not create any
destabilizing precedent in the practice of
post-Cold War international relations
This report is organized in ive main sections,
preceded by this introduction and followed by our
conclusions and recommendations.
Section 2 addresses Kosova’s economic and social
problems, linked to its political isolation by the
international community over the past six years.
It argues that a positive settlement of the status
issue would establish the necessary basic
conditions for a much more investor-friendly
environment; it would also end the social and
cultural isolation of Kosovakeenly felt by its
young population, which must be offered choices
other than unemployment, emigration or political
extremism.
Section 3 tackles Kosova’s constitutional
position in the former Yugoslav federation, and
during the events leading to the latter’s
dissolution. The fact that within former
Yugoslavia Kosovawas a fully self-governing
entity, effectively on a par with
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia or
Slovenia, provides a strong argument in favour of
its independence.
Section 4 provides a brief survey of recent and
more distant history, moving back from the reasons
for Serbia’s latest aggression against Kosova and
NATO’s intervention to the bitter experience of
the Albanian population under Belgrade’s direct
rule, beginning with the violent annexation of
Kosovain 1912.
Section 5 considers key reservations expressed
about Kosova’s independence, and some problematic
suggested alternatives to full independence. The
report contends that any solution that does not
place sovereignty over Kosovairmly in the hands of
the government in Prishtina will lead to domestic
and regional instability and derail the process of
internal democratization. To leave the issue of
who exercises sovereignty in Kosovaambiguously
deined, to restore sovereignty to Belgrade, or to
delegate it once again however temporarily to some
international administrative structure - all of
these would merely serve to impede the formation
of a politically strong citizenry and an active
civil society: ones capable of exercising, not
just symbolically but also materially, ownership
of and responsibility for their own government.
Section 6 addresses the problem of the Serb
minority, which for many diplomatic circles
represents the Achilles heel of normal democratic
proposals for resolving Kosova’s status. We argue,
on the contrary, that precisely only an
independent Kosovawith an active civil society
will be able to create proper political conditions
for the safety and full integration of its
minorities, and in particular the Serb one.
In its closing paragraphs (Section 7), we offer a
number of summary conclusions, with key
recommendations on the future steps that stem from
these.
2. Status Resolution as a Way Out of Kosova’s
Economic Crisis and its Political and Cultural
Isolation
Contemporary Kosova’s acute problems are a direct
manifestation of the uncertainty of its current
status. In Caddition to the prevailing grave
economic crisis, there is also its cultural and
political isolation from Europe and the
international community, likewise due to the
status impasse. This section argues why the
settlement of Kosova’s status through independence
will create the necessary conditions for resolving
its serious economic and social problems.
Status and the economic situation
Following a rapid revival in 1999-2002, when
major investments were made to repair the material
and human casualties of war, the economy of
Kosovais now in serious crisis. According to
latest estimates by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), Kosova’s GDP growth this year (2005)
will be negative (-0.5%), the only such case in
Europe. The unemployment rate in Kosovais 40-45%,
the highest in Europe. Most of the unemployed are
young people, since 63% of Kosova’s population is
under 30. Unemployment and poverty have no ethnic
boundaries, and they threaten the most vulnerable
groups of society, families victimized by war, the
rural population, the elderly, women and the
minorities. This implies a need to launch drastic
measures to place Kosova’s economy on a track of
development and growth. Rapid economic development
is the only route to addressing social problems
and imbalances in the economic coniguration (GDP;
consumption; exports and imports; supply and
demand in the labour market; budgetary capacities;
needs for public capital investment, etc).
Uncertainty over the political future of Kosova
and weaknesses in the dual governing structure -
UNMIK’s international administration and the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government - have
impeded the creation of more attractive conditions
for local and foreign investors. Some 25-30,000
new jobs need to be created every year, i.e. three
times the current estimates, in order to address
successfully the problem of unemployment. This
requires investment, and full access to and
cooperation with international inancial
institutions - in other words, Kosova’s full
integration into the global economy.
The two key routes for Kosova’s economic
development remain effectively blocked as a result
of its unresolved status. The irst route is the
privatization of former socially owned enterprises
(SOEs), while the second is access to loans and
assistance from international inancial
institutions.
The privatization process in Kosovabegan after a
three-year delay caused by legal problems
surrounding the question of ownership - problems
that lowed directly from the uncertainty about who
wielded sovereignty over the territory as a whole.
The process of privatization started with
establishment of the KosovaTrust Agency (KTA) in
June 2002, under the auspices of the EU Pillar.
The task of the KTA was to sell the assets of
around 500 SOEs, so that these might contribute to
economic development and create new jobs. However,
the process was blocked repeatedly as a result of
legal ownership disputes. It did resume in the
irst half of this year, but the lengthy impasse
has left an uncertain feeling among investors,
since a permanent threat of ownership disputes
lurks in the background. UNMIK is incapable of
resolving this matter, because it is only a
provisional administrator of property. The
resolution of Kosova’s status through independence
could mean recognizing the right of the
KosovaAssembly to adopt laws on property
privatization, thus placing property disputes
under the jurisdiction of Kosova’s own judicial
system. This would be in conformity with the pre-Miloševic
situation, when Kosova’s Assembly - not Serbia -
was the sole legal owner of social property in
Kosova, as a result of which property disputes
were handled exclusively by the Kosovaor
judiciary.
The other route for economic development namely
capital investments in infrastructure and the
creation of favorable conditions for business
loans has likewise been blocked as a result of the
status limbo. For in the eyes of the international
community Kosovais not a sovereign entity, so it
does not have access to loans from the World Bank
(WB) or IMF.
This state of affairs has created a vicious
cycle. Economic development is one of the
standards laid down by the international community
before the status process can be initiated, yet
its implementation is impossible since Kosovalacks
the necessary means. Despite numerous
improvisations over the past six years, it is
clear that only the resolution of status will make
it possible to tackle Kosova’s basic economic
problems and pave the way for its development and
full integration into the European and global
economy.
In direct correlation with its political status,
sceptics and opponents of independence often claim
that an independent Kosovawould not be
economically viable. This issue can be viewed,
however, from a different perspective: who but
Kosovaors can ensure their country’s economic
survival? It is clear that resolution of the
status issue in favour of independence should
ensure greater economic self-reliance and better
management of economic resources. At the same
time, with regard to human resources, Kosova-
thanks to its young and vital population - could
have an advantage over other countries of the
region in an open market economy and within
regional and EU integration processes.
Kosovaproved its capacity for ensuring economic
independence even under Miloševic ‘s rule, when
its underground institutional infrastructure
underpinned both an active peaceful as well as an
armed resistance during the 1990s. After the war
and despite its effects, the institutional
structures have since 2003 proved capable of
sustaining the KosovaConsolidated Budget.
The isolation of Kosova
The international community has provided
considerable assistance for the reconstruction of
Kosova and the establishment of new institutions.
Investments in Kosovaby the European Union alone
over the past six years have totalled some 2.3
billion. The decision of the international
community to delay the resolution of Kosova’s
status has nevertheless had serious consequences
for development in several areas. It is something
of a paradox that the period of international
presence since 1999 has also been the period of
Kosova’s greatest relative isolation from the rest
of the world.
Thus, for example, representatives of the local
institutions, government, ministries, national
assembly and presidential ofice have been unable
to join their SCG counterparts on visits to
international meetings and summits, in order to
contribute to diplomatic and other discussions
regarding developments in Kosova. While during
most of the 1990s Kosova’s political
representatives were regularly received by Western
governments, today, when Kosova’s institutions
have been established under the auspices of the
United Nations, Kosova’s representatives have a
much harder time gaining access to diplomatic and
political oficials throughout the world. It is
indeed strange that Kosovahas no liaison ofices in
foreign countries, and its government no portfolio
for foreign affairs. In fact Kosovais not
represented in any regional, European or global
organization: neither in the UN, nor in the
Stability Pact, the OSCE or the Council of Europe.
Moreover, this isolation is apparent in all areas
of life. In the economic sphere, requests by
Kosovaor leaders for investment have met with a
single response from the international
representatives, namely that this is impossible
due to the unresolved status’. In the ield of
education, Kosovahas not been admitted into the
Bologna Process, despite having a clear policy of
higher education reforms, and despite the fact
that all European countries (with the exception of
Belarus) and many Caucasian states are already
part of this process. Experience in the areas of
scientiic research, culture and sports are
similar. With the exception of a few sporadic and
largely symbolic actions, Kosovar society has been
deprived of communication with foreign bodies for
the same alleged reason. On the rare occasions
when a delegation from Kosovais invited to attend
international meetings, Serbian representatives
react by opposing any public presentation by it.
Isolation is both institutional and physical.
Kosova’s inhabitants can travel only with
documents issued by UNMIK, which they acquire
after many dificulties and which expire quickly.
Moreover, many countries do not recognize such
documents. Kosovars need visas for all countries
apart from Albania and Macedonia, a rather
dificult requirement given the absence of foreign
embassies in Prishtina. Kosovaors living abroad,
of whom there are considerable numbers due to
emigration in the 1970s, 80s and 90s, are not
entitled to use the UNMIK documents to establish
permanent residence in foreign countries, but
instead are forced to obtain passports of the
Union of Serbia and Montenegro. This submits them
to maltreatment, neglect and blackmail, or in some
cases even the denial of consular services. In
other words, this population experiences directly
Kosova’s lack of political status.
To make matters worse, Kosova’s post-1999
segregation from the world - following a decade of
isolation imposed by Serbia through systematic
terror - has had grave consequences both for its
development and for its communication with
international organizations, something that would
have helped solve its long-accumulated problems.
We are certain that improved communications with
international organizations, and Kosova’s
integration into the world community, will help
place Kosovaon a safe track towards the
implementation of European standards of economic
growth, democratization and political stability.
At the same time, such communication will help to
overcome negative phenomena among the new
political parties and institutions of Kosova:
corruption, incompetence, inertia and
irresponsibility.
This is an urgent necessity for Kosova, one that
does not permit the luxury of further
postponement. There are currently over 350,000
students in Kosova, who in a few years will join
the labour market. If this population cannot ind
jobs and a future in Kosova, it will soon ind its
way to the doorsteps of West European countries.
3. Kosova’s Constitutional Position in the
Former Yugoslav Federation
The international community’s protracted
maintenance of Kosova’s current ill-deined and
uncertain status is all the Tmore strange in view
of its self-governing status within the former
Yugoslavia. The status issue is habitually treated
by international diplomatic and political circles
outside the historical context of the construction
and dissolution of the former Yugoslav federation,
with all its weighty consequences for Kosova’s
sovereignty. Keeping to essentials, this section
briely highlights a number of salient historical
facts indicating that the problem of Kosova’s
status was essentially invented by Miloševic.
The inevitable starting point is the juridical
reality that, by virtue of the constitution of the
former Yugoslavia, Kosova, while nominally not
enjoying the status of a fully-ledged republic,
nonetheless possessed practically all attributes
and functions pertaining to the republics of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY),
subsequently recognized as the latter’s legal
successors.
Thus according to both the federal constitution
and its own, Kosovafunctioned within the Yugoslav
federation as an independent and self-governing
unit. The political administration of
Kosovaconsisted of structures wielding autonomous
legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The
Assembly was the highest legislative body within
the territory of Kosova, and the Constitutional
Court of Kosovathe highest judicial authority.
Like the other federal units - the six republics
and the province of Vojvodina - Kosovahad its own
independent judiciary, while executive power
rested in the hands of its own government, which
controlled its police and territorial defence
forces.
In 1989 the regime of Slobodan Miloševic , as
part of its efforts to destroy the existing
Yugoslav constitutional order, abolished the
autonomous status of Kosova- in contravention of
the existing Yugoslav constitution - by resorting
to a combination of political pressure and use of
force in order to absorb Kosovainto
Serbia’s legal and political
system. At the time of Yugoslavia’s collapse, and
in line with similar actions in other federal
units, its Assembly declared Kosovaa sovereign
entity on 2 July 1990. In September 1990 the
Assembly adopted the Constitution of the Republic
of Kosova. In the same month the population
reafirmed its will to independence by way of a
referendum.
The fact that Kosovafunctioned as an independent
entity for nearly ive decades, half of that time
with full self government, challenges the
allegation that the Republic of Kosovahad never
been a state entity or that it arose out of
nothing. Given its former status as one of
Yugoslavia’s eight self-governing territories,
Kosovais neither politically nor legally
comparable to such secessionist creations as
Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The problem of Kosovatoday arose exclusively as a
consequence of the political and military
aggression waged against it by the Miloševic
regime in the late 1980s and early 90s, as part of
the latter’s general onslaught against the
Yugoslav federation. The refusal of Kosova’s
population to accept their country’s violent
integration into Serbia was a legal and legitimate
act, by contrast with Miloševic ‘s aggression
which - as is widely recognized - formed merely
the initial step in his regime’s destruction of
the political equilibrium established in the
region by the creation of the Yugoslav federation
at the end of World War II, and within that
federation of the self-governing entity of Kosova.
In view of these historical, political and
constitutional precedents, it is easy to
understand the frustration felt by the Kosovaor
population when faced with the current legal and
political reservations against their country’s
independence. One of the frequently mentioned
caveats - no border changes - contrary to all
legal evidence assumes Kosovato have been an
inseparable part of the former Yugoslav republic
of Serbia. Certain circles even talk about a
possible domino effect, claiming that recognition
of Kosova’s independence would lead to further
divisions in the Balkans. Such arguments are
frequently voiced also by Serbian parties and
governmental circles. But they completely ignore
the political context of the wars of the Yugoslav
succession, which inevitably came to involve also
Kosova and which motivated Kosova’s demand for
independence.
Faced with the dissolution of the Yugoslav
federation, the international community in 1992
recognized Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Macedonia but not Kosova, accepting - more by
default than through any consideration of the
legalities - the fact that at the time of
Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 1991 Serbia had
already annexed Kosova. Yet the criteria governing
recognition for the constituent units of the
former Yugoslavia relied on the Yugoslav
constitution on the one hand, on referendums in
which the majority of the populations concerned
had declared for independence on the other. It is
obvious that the same arguments hold true also for
Kosova(2).
The issue of Kosovawas set aside at the time when
the other successor states were recognized,
despite the fact that as a federal unit it met all
the same criteria as they did: it had its own
constitution, government, assembly, bounded
territory, all deined and guaranteed by the
Yugoslav federal constitution3. The legal and
constitutional differences between the status of
Kosova and that of the six republics were minor
and non-
essential, whereas their similarities in terms of
competency were crucial. For example, at the
all-Yugoslav level Kosovaexercised a right of veto
in legal, political and economic decision-making
equal to that of other federal units. Moreover, it
is well known that the right to adopt and repeal
laws deines the sovereignty of a state. Lastly, in
the referendum of 1991 - analogous to those held
in other federal units - the majority of Kosova’s
population voted for independence.
It is important to recall in this way the legal,
constitutional and political status of Kosova and
its people within the former Yugoslav federation,
because to do so places the conlict between Serbia
and Kosovaover the latter’s status into its proper
political context, and refutes any
over-simplifying approach that seeks to explain
the conlict as an ethnic one between the Albanian
and Serb communities. The political conlict over
Kosova, while indeed often manifested through
internal ethnic divisions, is in fact essentially
a by-product of Belgrade’s policies rather than
being rooted in any long-standing intolerance
between two rival ethnic communities. Albanians
and Serbs in Kosovahave a long history of
co-existence, whereas violent confrontations have
been episodic and brief. Policies enacted by the
Serbian state - and not endogenous factors, or
‘ancient hatreds’ between Albanians and Serbs -
have been the main motor of the conlict in Kosova.
4. Kosovars a Colonial Problem: Albanians
under Belgrade Rule
Serbia’s treatment of Albanians as an oppressed
and unwanted people did not begin with the war of
1999, or Swith Miloševic ‘s rise to power in 1989.
Ever since Serbia’s invasion and annexation of
Kosovain 1912-13 - i.e. of a territory where,
according even to Serbian estimates, around 60% of
the population was non-Serb - Kosovaor Albanians
have suffered constant repression and persecution,
and have continuously been viewed by Serb
nationalists as a threat to the interests of the
Serbian state. At the same time, Serbia’s
expansion into non-Serb territories and the
systematic maltreatment of its non-Serb population
has had a deleterious effect on its will and
capacity to create a democratic polity. The
anti-Albanian policy continued after the formation
of the Yugoslav kingdom in 1918. Albanians were
deprived of the right to education in their mother
tongue; their rights as a minority population
(rights enjoyed by other minorities such as the
Hungarians and Germans in the north) were not
recognized; and they were excluded from
citizenship. Until 1929 indeed, Belgrade
emphatically denied the existence of any Albanian
minority in the kingdom, while simultaneously
instituting a policy aimed at changing the ethnic
structure of the Kosovaor population. In the
period between the two world wars, Serbia
confiscated over 200,000 hectares of land from the
local population - nearly half of all arable land
- and distributed it to Serb settlers. The number
of settlers soon rose to around 60,000, or over
15% of the overall population. There were also
plans, only partly realized, to deport most of the
Albanian population of Kosovato Turkey. After the
end of World War II and the constitution of
Federal Yugoslavia, Kosovabecame an autonomous
province within the newly constituted Republic of
Serbia. Anti-Albanian terror continued, however,
under the direction of the Serbian and Yugoslav
hard-line leader, interior minister Alexander
Rankovic (4). It was only after his removal and
the marginalization of dogmatists within the
Yugoslav League of Communists in the mid 1960s
that it became possible to create a new
constitutional arrangement, as a result of which
Serbian rule was removed from Kosova. The latter
now became a self-governing federal unit, with
rights and responsibilities equal to that of
Yugoslavia’s six republics and the province of
Vojvodina. It remained a self-governing federal
entity until 1989, when an orchestrated campaign
to revise the Yugoslav constitution was launched
by the Communist League of Serbia headed by
Slobodan Miloševic . Kosova’s autonomy became the
first casualty in Miloševic ‘s war against Federal
Yugoslavia(5). Following the violent abrogation of
Kosova’s autonomy in 1989, Miloševic ‘s regime
expelled Albanians en masse from state and public
employment (around 90% of Albanians working in the
administration and 70% of those working in public
and socially owned enterprises were dismissed);
shut down the University of Prishtina and nearly
all high schools; closed down or muzzled
Albanian-language media; exerted brutal repression
against Albanian political activists; and
established a generalized system of apartheid in
Kosova, where the Serb minority now ruled with the
military, police, political and economic backing
of Belgrade. During the 1990s, Belgrade tried to
return Kosovato the condition in which it had been
in the 1930s. This project was destined to fail,
however, because the Albanian population was no
longer what it had been at that time, having
already enjoyed an improved political position
under the advanced autonomy of the former Yugoslav
federation and Kosova’s own institutional and
state structures. Thus the attempt to bring
Kosovaback to a regressive state triggered a mass
mobilization of its Albanian inhabitants,
initially for resistance and later to fight for
the right of self-determination, as with the other
entities of the former Yugoslavia(6). The
Albanians’ bitter experience under Belgrade’s rule
during most of the twentieth century, culminating
in the mass killings and expulsions of 1999,
abolished any Serbian claim to legitimate rule
over Kosova. It is clear, moreover, that the
attitude of the Serbian leadership towards
Kosovahas undergone no fundamental change despite
the removal of Miloševic from power.
Faced with systematic Serbian state terror, the
KosovaAlbanians maintained a peaceful resistance
for several years. At the end of the 1990s,
however, when purely political resistance had
proved ineffective, the armed resistance of the
KosovaLiberation Army was born. This won the
support of the majority of Kosovaors. We view
these two forms of resistance as complementary
rather than exclusive, since each under certain
circumstances and at a certain time contributed to
fulfilling the aspirations of the people of Kosova.
NATO’s military intervention in 1999 following
the unanimous decision of 22 countries and in
support of chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the
resulting withdrawal of Serbian forces, created
conditions for a just settlement of Kosova’s
future in the form of international recognition of
its independence. This decision should have been
made by the Western powers already in 1999, but
for various reasons - including pressure from
Russia and lack of determination among Western
political and diplomatic circles - it was not. The
delay further complicated the situation in Kosova
and the Balkans. The international civilian and
military presence in Kosova- KFOR and UNMIK -
created conditions for security, reconstruction,
and the establishment of the first democratic
institutions after the 2001 municipal elections
and the subsequent parliamentary ones. However,
the fundamental question in Kosova- the
sovereignty over its territory - remained
unresolved. Without a definitive solution to this
problem, it is illusory to hope for long-lasting
stability in Kosova and the Balkans. As mentioned
earlier in this report, the crisis and dissolution
of the former Yugoslavia was set into motion by
Serbia’s violent policy towards the Albanians of
Kosova. The Serbian leadership even now continues
to mobilize Serbs in both Kosova and Serbia on a
nationalist platform. In the last couple of years,
rather than focusing on Serbia’s democratization
and its serious economic and social problems,
Serbian political parties and opinion makers have
preferred to keep the Kosovaissue on the boil.
Recent opinion polls and monitoring of the Serbian
media show a high level of hatred against
Albanians, much higher than against other nations
with whom Serbia fought even bloodier wars, such
as Croats or Bosnians. At a conference held in
Prishtina in June 2005, two of the most prominent
Serbian intellectuals and political activists,
Žarko Korac and Latinka Perovic , denounced such
attitudes as shameful and racist (7).
Official Serbia has never admitted the atrocities
perpetrated by their forces against the Albanian
population of Kosovaduring the war of 1999. This
aggression, which principally targeted the
civilian population, resulted in the killing of
nearly 10,000 people; the expulsion of almost half
the local Albanian population; the disappearance
of thousands; the rape of countless women; the
destruction of nearly 150,000 homes; as well as
other traumata and sufferings impossible to
quantify. It is illusory, if not downright
immoral, to believe that after such an experience
a population could be forced to live in a union
with the state that carried out such aggression,
and that has yet to express remorse and accept
full responsibility (8).
The complete and unconditional separation of
Kosova and Serbia would represent both a guarantee
to Albanians that they will not face renewed
repression, and an opportunity for Serbia
seriously to address its past and redefine its
political identity. Freeing Serbia from
Kosovawould represent an opportunity for it to
break once and for all with aggressive nationalism
and archaic colonial thinking, and to commit
itself to its own democratization. Such a
development would provide the basis for a healthy
and peaceful cooperation and co-existence between
Serbia and Kosovain the Balkans.
5. Why Reservations About Independence are
Misplaced
Peace and stability in the Balkans are in the
interest of all - the citizens of Balkan countries
as well as the entire international
Pcommunity.Some of the reservations expressed
about Kosova’s independence rely on claims that
recognizing it would trigger off regional
instability, including new armed conlicts. Fear of
regional destabilization has consequently led
various international policy-making circles to
seek alternative solutions for Kosova’s status,
such as broad autonomy within the Union of Serbia
and Montenegro’ or independence without
sovereignty’.
In this section we rebut claims that recognition
of an independent Kosovawould risk regional
instability. We argue that, on the contrary, a
clear stance on the sovereignty and international
legal character of Kosovaare essential precisely
for stability in the region.
Complications arising from delay
The international community’s delay in resolving
the status of Kosovahas only complicated the
political situation there and throughout the
region. Negative consequences of delaying a
solution include the following:There is widespread
uncertainty and fear among KosovaAlbanians
regarding their future, especially since until
recently a return of Serbian rule was not firmly
and explicitly ruled out by the international
community.
Similar uncertainty and fear affect also
KosovaSerbs, and are relected among their
political leaders, who in the hope of a
re-establishment of Serbian rule over Kosovahave
hung back from joining the new Kosovainstitutions.
Observing the lack of a clear position by the
international community on Kosova’s status,
Serbian political parties and opinion-makers began
manipulating the Kosovaissue for their own
internal and external purposes. This has created
room for political processes that might once again
endanger the fragile stability of the region. It
has been harder to achieve agreed political
solutions guaranteeing special constitutional and
legal rights for the Serb minority. Thus, for
example the political context created by Kosova’s
unresolved status has overly politicized the issue
of decentralization, raising fears among the
public that this might lead to a new - ethnically
based - territorial division of Kosova, as a irst
step towards its partition and even eventually
towards annexation by Serbia of Serb-inhabited
territories in the north and east.
Delays in resolving Kosova’s status have thus
created grave obstacles to Kosova’s institutional
and economic reconstruction. It was only after the
violent events of 17-18 March 2004, in fact, that
the international community’s representatives made
their irst public proposals for addressing the
status issue. The violence, which took on an
ethnic character and culminated in the burning of
Serb houses and churches, exposed the weaknesses
of both Kosovaor political and civil society and
the international organizations, particularly
UNMIK and KFOR. Frustration over the lack of a
clear future, especially among young Kosovaors,
was clearly exploited by Albanian extremists and
channelled toward ethnically motivated violence.
These tragic events provoked strong reactions
both within Kosovaor society and among
international political circles, highlighted by a
sharply critical report from the UN Secretary
General’s special envoy Kai Eide and by subsequent
diplomatic developments. It is ironic that these
tragic events had to occur, in order for the
international community to focus its attention on
the need to address the status question without
further delay. The March riots at last made the
international community aware of how the status
impasse continually generates new dissatisfaction
and frustration, inciting tensions and threatening
fresh outbursts. Yet it has still not demonstrated
the necessary commitment to bring closure to the
problem, by completing the process begun with the
dissolution of Yugoslavia and recognizing Kosovaas
a sovereign state.
Kosova’s independence and the status of Bosnia
and Macedonia
In objecting to Kosova’s independence, Serbian
politicians often employ the argument that this
could lead to the dissolution of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, through the secession of
Republika Srpska and its uniication with Serbia.
The same argument is heard at times from Western
analysts and diplomats. But this argument is
unfounded for several reasons. First, as indicated
above, there is an essential difference between
the status of Kosova and that of
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska. While
Kosovawas a federal unit of the former Yugoslavia,
with similar constitutional competencies to the
republics, Republika Srpska was created ab novo in
the early 1990s, by means of ethnic cleansing and
mass crimes committed against the civilian
population, including genocide. The international
community accepted the Serb entity in
Bosnia-Herzegovina for purely pragmatic reasons,
whereas Kosova’s right to international
recognition rests on its legally and
constitutionally validated status within the
former Yugoslav federation.
There is similar confusion over the potential
repercussions of Kosova’s independence for
Macedonia. Serbian politicians and certain Western
diplomats claim that recognizing Kosova’s
independence would lead to a division of
Macedonia, and to the uniication of its mainly
Albanian-inhabited western part with Kosova. Such
an assumption, however, is not in accordance with
political realities in Macedonia. While that
country’s Albanian political parties - and its
Albanian population generally - do support the
demand of Kosovaors for independence, they have
also made it clear that they want to achieve their
own rights within the Republic of Macedonia.
Independent studies of the region demonstrate that
Kosova’s independence would in fact have a
positive impact on the stability and integration
of Macedonia, not least because it would establish
an internationally recognized border between the
two states. The majority of Macedonian politicians
too have come to recognize that respecting the
political will of the people of Kosovawould have a
positive impact on their country’s stability. In
June 2005 there was a successful meeting between
the current Kosovaor prime minister and his
Macedonian counterpart. The Macedonian government
has indeed clearly stated that any democratic
solution for Kosova’s status would be acceptable
to it. Hence, Kosova’s independence poses no
threat to the integrity and stability of
Macedonia. On the contrary, we believe that
obstructing it could lead to possible revolts not
only among the Albanians of Kosovaitself, but also
among those of Macedonia - something that could
incite wider disintegrative processes in the
region.
Problematic alternatives to full independence
The preliminary positions of the EU and US on
Kosova’s status exclude three options: return to
the pre-1999 situation; partition; and uniication
with other states in the region. Exclusion of
these three options has removed certain threats
hanging like dark clouds over Kosova, but the
crucial issues for any inal settlement still
remain to be resolved.
In their reports this year the International
Crisis Group (ICG) and the International
Commission on the Balkans (ICB), two of the most
prestigious international organizations, announced
their support for Kosova’s independence as the
best and most realistic option. They argued for an
initial phase of conditional independence’, in the
sense of preserving for a certain period the
authority of the international community in
protecting human and minority rights. These
reports, as well as opinions expressed by the
representatives of various Western countries,
emphasize the need for a presence of international
troops in Kosova(extension of KFOR’s mandate, or
deployment of another NATO formation, or EU
troops) for an open-ended period, even after the
resolution of status.
The vast majority of Kosova’s population will not
object to the presence of foreign troops as
guarantors of stability and security, provided
that Kosovais granted its merited status within
international organizations and institutions,
beginning with membership of the United Nations.
It is only after Kosovahas acquired real
independence and become a proper state that it
will be in a position - as a consequence of the
declared will of its population - to share
elements of its sovereignty, in the sense of
allowing international military and civilian
missions to provide security for all its citizens
and ethnic communities.
EU and US representatives insist that any
settlement of Kosova’s status must include
negotiations between the Serbian and Kosovaor
governments. It is dificult to deny the need for
such talks, even more so bearing in mind the
numerous unresolved technical issues between
Serbia and Kosova. It is understandable too that
the international community should wish to proceed
with the agreement and consent of Serbia, so that
a long-term solution can be reached, and tensions
and regional instability avoided. However, this
approach involves some dificulties. So far,
Serbia’s political leadership has ruled out
independence as an option, and recently it has
been proposing the ‘more than autonomy, less than
independence’ model as what it calls a
compromise’. But this formula does not offer
conditions for a viable solution, not least
because it entails embracing a strange and
contradictory set-up unseen in international
practice, which would lead only to growing
tensions and conlict rather than a stable and
long-term solution.
Kosova’s independence, on the other hand, is
necessary in order to implement its integration
into EU and Atlantic structures. The EU, the US
and international committees of experts all
support Kosova’s request for integration. But
integration implies independence. The fact is that
the EU and Atlantic structures are made up of
members that are sovereign states, not territories
with an experimental status. Therefore,
Kosovacannot be integrated into these structures
through the formula of ‘more than autonomy, less
than independence’.
The truth is that Kosovahas had a conditional and
dual status for six years now: it is not an
independent and internationally recognized state,
yet at the same time it is independent from Serbia
through an international protectorate. There is no
good reason for such dualism and ambiguity to be
perpetuated in another shape or form. We strongly
believe that whereas no danger will be entailed by
the international community’s recognition of
Kosovaas a sovereign state, an unsustainable
compromise imposed by the international community
regarding its status - one that avoided specifying
the ultimate bearer of sovereignty - would indeed
contain great dangers for the stability of the
region. Such a solution would be defective irst
and foremost in that, by conserving uncertainty
surrounding Kosova’s international legal
character, it would bar it from participation in
international institutions, with all the serious
consequences for its population that were detailed
in Section 2 above.
The international community is perfectly aware of
the fact that the Serbian leadership, though aware
that it cannot regain direct rule over Kosova,
remains inhibited by Serbia’s internal political
climate from adopting a more realistic stance
regarding Kosova’s full separation from Serbia. It
is, therefore, more likely than not that
negotiations between representatives of Kosova and
Serbia will indeed take place, but with little
chance of reaching an agreement.
We believe that representatives of the
international community, having assumed political
responsibility by launching military intervention
and establishing an international protectorate in
Kosova, should - along with its people - be the
ones to have the inal say on its status. This
would make it easier for the Serbian leadership
and public to accept Kosova’s independence, and to
interpret it as a realistic and inevitable
solution arising from federal Yugoslavia’s
dissolution.
In addressing the status issue, the diplomatic
community cannot treat the Kosovaor and Serbian
leaderships’ claims over Kosova’s future status as
symmetrical and of equal legitimacy, for the
following reasons:
a) It is the democratically expressed will of its
population that Kosovashould join the
international community as an independent state.
Polls on the issue show that 93% of Albanians and
87% of non-Serb minorities in Kosovasupport
independence.
b) It was not Kosovathat initiated aggression
against Serbia, but the other way around. It was
Serbia not Kosovathat forced the international
community to launch military intervention. (Before
attacking Kosova, indeed, Serbia had precipitated
three earlier wars of aggression in the region:
against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.)
There is a real risk that talks between Kosovaor
and Serbian representatives on the issue of status
could drag on indeinitely. An interminable
negotiating process is likely to feed into the
vacillations and calculations of certain political
circles in Europe, particularly those which cannot
free themselves from old ways of viewing Balkan
problems. Any such delay in reaching a solution
could provoke new political tensions both in
Kosova and in Serbia, impeding the implementation
of policies addressing the serious economic and
social problems of both countries. Any faltering
or vacillation in addressing the issue of Kosova’s
status in an expedient manner is bound in
particular to cause social and political
instability within Kosovaitself.
Kosova’s independence and democratization of
the Western Balkans
Kosova’s independence is a logical and just
conclusion to the international intervention, and
will be fully justiied when the institutions,
procedures and values of a functioning and
sustainable democratic system are established not
only in Kosova, but in Serbia and throughout the
region as well. Some people may believe that the
project of democratization can be achieved by
forcing Kosovainto a union with Serbia, or into
the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, but this would
never work for the reasons speciied above. It is
far more eficient and pragmatic to approach the
democratic development of these three entities
separately, rather than to invest effort in a
complicated and ultimately unworkable federal or
confederal union of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosova.
We think, moreover, that it would be much easier
to establish and guarantee national and political
rights for the Serb minority in Kosova, which
numbers around 200,000 (including those yet to
return), than to try to convince over two million
Kosovaor Albanians to join Serbia, a country which
they perceive as prejudiced, foreign, and a threat
to their freedom. The instruments to guarantee
national, political and economic rights for the
Serb minority will be much more easily implemented
in a democratic Kosovathan similar conditions for
kosovar Albanians would be in a hypothetical
common framework with Serbia and Montenegro.
This is due not only to the fact that the union
of the latter is unlikely to last, given
Montenegro’s desire to achieve its own
independence from Serbia, but also because Kosova-
unlike Serbia and Montenegro - already possesses
instruments of direct control and democratic
development (UNMIK, OSCE, KFOR and international
police forces). Installing such international
missions in Serbia would be tantamount to a second
intervention, and would constitute an even more
serious violation of Serbia’s sovereignty.
6 Ensuring Minority Rights and Kosova’s Status
The international community has included
guarantees for the security of the Serb minority
among the basic conditions Tfor addressing the
status of Kosova. The fact that this issue seems
to have become an obstacle to moving forward has
aggravated relations between the Albanian majority
and the Serb minority. The Albanians are
frustrated by the fact that the Serb minority
appears as the main obstacle to independence. The
Serbs, meanwhile, fearful of taking any action
that might appear to legitimize Kosova’s
separation from Serbia, refuse to join political
processes designed to agree their own legal and
security position within the political and
judicial institutions of Kosova, in particular
through a widespread boycott of parliamentary
elections.
Political tensions between the majority and the
minority can and should be viewed in a different
perspective, however, in relation not just to the
issue of sovereignty, but also to the entire
corpus of human rights and freedoms that should be
guaranteed and implemented in Kosova(within the
framework of European standards, and other
conventions for the protection of human and
minority rights and freedoms).
The majority in Kosovamust certainly carry the
biggest share of responsibility for ensuring a
normal life and guaranteeing rights for
minorities. The Albanian majority’s readiness to
accept this responsibility in regard to the rights
of most minorities is relected in its relatively
good relations with non-Serb minorities, which
play an active role in Kosova’s political
institutions. Ethnic tensions present between it
and the Serb population derive mainly from the
still raw memory of rule by the Serb minority in
the 1990’s and during the conlict, when most
kosovar Serbs openly supported - or were involved
as militants of - the Miloševic regime.
Being relatively small in numbers and
territorially dispersed, however, the Serb
minority objectively lacks the potential to
obstruct the resolution of Kosova’s status in the
longer term. As soon as kosovar Serbs are freed
from Belgrade’s tutelage and inluence, they will
no longer be considered a threat to Kosova’s
territorial integration or political stability,
even if they are guaranteed broader political and
national rights within a more advanced
decentralized system. For their part, however, the
Serbs should see their interest in advancing a
free and democratic Kosovaby becoming its loyal
citizens. By viewing such a Kosovaas the locus of
their own democratic rights, Serbs would enable
themselves to join its government and society in
creating space and infrastructure for a mass
return of those who led during and after the war.
But the key condition for any such turning-point
to be reached in relations between Albanians and
Serbs in Kosovais for Serbia to cease fostering
the illusion that Kosovamay once again be run from
Belgrade. The international community should
indeed make it clear to the Serb minority that any
return of Serbian rule to Kosovais a false hope,
and that consequently they should seek their
individual and collective future within the
political and social institutions of Kosovaitself.
With respect to the implementation of returns and
minority rights, one highly sensitive obstacle is
Belgrade’s manipulation of the real numbers of
KosovaSerbs, whether currently residing in kosovar
living as displaced persons elsewhere. Serbian
oficial sources claim that over 200,000 Serbs led
Kosovaafter the NATO intervention, while
approximately 150,000 Serbs are currently living
in Kosova, thus arriving at a total kosovar Serb
population of over 350,000.These numbers are
highly exaggerated. Serbian estimates for the
prewar period spoke of 200-220,000 Serbs living in
Kosova, 150,000 of whom were long-established
residents, while the rest had settled over the
past two or three decades as part of the economic
migrations that were normal across the former
Yugoslav federation.
In order to avoid any possibility of manipulating
minority percentages, it would be best for a
census to be organized in Kosovaas soon as
possible, according to international standards and
monitored by neutral parties. A complete census
both of the resident population and of the
displaced who consider themselves citizens of
Kosovawould permit the creation of an invaluable
database, which would not just register the ethnic
and other backgrounds of Kosova’s citizens, but
also provide a more realistic picture of their
property and rights.
So far as the return of displaced persons is
concerned, this is an immediate issue for those
ready and willing to reintegrate into kosovar
society. In this connection, the pledge by the
Kosovagovernment and UNMIK that the sustainable
return of large numbers of Serbs, Roma and other
minorities will be pursued needs more determined
and transparent support from kosovar society at
large. However, no illusions should be harboured
about an immediate return en masse of all
displaced people. In the next six-month to
one-year period, it would be encouraging and
realistic to have a number of returns amounting
perhaps to between ive and ten thousand. This
could change the general climate and rebuild trust
between minorities and majority, with a view to
achieving sustainable mutual cooperation and
understanding. This implies that the process of
return would not end with Kosova’s independence,
but would remain one of the key obligations of any
independence agreement, guaranteed and monitored
by the international community. One encouraging
fact is that a growing number of kosovar Albanians
now support return of the displaced (70% in June
2005, EWR nr. 10 UNDP/Riinvest) (9).
The Kosovagovernment, political parties and civil
society organizations must as soon as possible
prepare awareness-raising programmes for the
majority on the need to advance minority rights
and freedoms, especially freedom of movement and
communication, as well as unimpeded use of
property. We strongly believe that after the
settlement of Kosova’s status, the majority of our
citizens will support all measures designed to
ensure protection, security and freedom of speech
and movement for minorities, as guaranteed in
every democratic society.
Cultural and historical heritage - for instance,
Kosova’s monasteries and other mediaeval sites -
represents a key area where with even short-term
planning considerable progress can be made,
achieving a disproportionate symbolic effect. The
Serb minority and the Orthodox Church are very
concerned about the status and safety of the Peja
Patriarchy, the monasteries in Decan and Gracanica,
and other historical and cultural sites that are
part of the world cultural heritage.
Kosovacitizens ought to be convinced that this is
not just the property of Serbs and the Orthodox
Church, but part of the heritage and cultural
wealth of Kosova. These are historical, cultural
and tourist resources that they should neither
view with animosity, nor consider as something
alien or dangerous for the state of Kosova. The
Orthodox Church of Albania could help in this
domain, by conveying the experience of religious
tolerance in Albania among Muslims, Catholics and
Orthodox. Even in Kosova, where there is no
Albanian Orthodox community, there has
historically been inter-religious tolerance and
cooperation, as shown by the fact that under
Ottoman rule Albanian Muslim notables acted as
guardians and protectors of Orthodox monasteries.
A generous offer on the status of the two
monasteries in the Dukagjin valley - the
Patriarchy and Decan - could be included in the
package of negotiations for creating conditions of
trust. This might involve the establishment of
some sort of special administration by the
Orthodox Church along with civil structures and
international guarantors, but involving also
representatives of the Kosovaauthorities and local
institutions.
Moreover, the Kosovagovernment and the majority
population should have no problem with the
legalization and free functioning of a public
university in the Serbian language in Kosova,
either within the University of Prishtina or
independently from it. Albanians still have fresh
memories of their struggle to open, legalize and
expand Albanian-language universities in Prishtina
and Tetovo (Macedonia), so they should have
nothing against the right of the Serb minority -
and other communities (Gorani, Bosniaks and Roma)
that speak Serb or similar languages - to be
educated in elementary schools and a public or
private university of their own.
A workable compromise is less likely, however, in
regard to demands linking the solution to the
political status of KosovaSerbs with territorial
autonomy. The situation in Kosovais not conducive
to territorial autonomy on an ethnic basis, due to
the small number and dispersed pattern of the Serb
communities among a dozen enclaves. The model of
the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia seems more
promising, in order to guarantee the status and
rights of KosovaSerbs. Instead of a territorial
autonomy that would threaten constant tension and
even Kosova’s ethnic partition, the model of the
Ohrid Agreement would offer the Serbs
implementation of their rights within local
decentralized government. Through constitutional
means they could regulate the protection of their
vital political, cultural, religious and economic
rights as a minority. Moreover, an international
agreement could designate an international
monitoring mission, to evaluate in the coming
years progress in the implementation of this
package of minority rights. The mission would have
the power to recommend sanctions and other
penalties for the Kosovagovernment in the event of
non-implementation. This would give the Serb
minority another guarantee that their future in
Kosovais not at risk.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The independence of Kosova is the only
historically justiied and politically viable
solution that will guarantee peace, stability and
development in the Balkans. Independence is a
realistic solution for Kosovabecause:
| Kosovawas an independent administrative and
political unit in the former Yugoslav federation.
The conlict in Kosovabegan as part of the
disintegration of the Yugoslav state. Therefore,
Kosova’s independence constitutes the inal chapter
of the dissolution process and the political
reorganization of the Balkans.
| As a result of its special status in the
Yugoslav federation, the case of Kosovais not the
same as that of other conlict areas such as
Republika Srpska (created by ethnic cleansing),
the Preševo valley or Macedonia (where the issue
at stake was how to advance the political position
of the Albanian minorities in Serbia and Macedonia
respectively). The resolution of Kosova’s status
should not be related to any of these disparate
issues, but should instead be based on its own
speciic history.
| Serbia has historically failed in governing
Kosova. Ever since its annexation of the latter in
1913, there has been a tendency in Serbia to treat
Kosovaas a colonial territory. The key generator
of conlict in Kosovawas Serbia’s aggressive and
repressive policy against the local Albanian
population, and not any hatred or lack of trust
between ethnic communities. With its aggression
and campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1999, Serbia
lost any legitimacy to rule over Kosovain any
shape or form.
| Independence is the only solution that will
pave the way to Kosova’s economic and social
development, especially bearing in mind the
massive unemployment, the young population and the
constant pressure for emigration. Placing
sovereignty in Prishtina’s hands will inally
enable Kosova’s integration into regional,
European and global institutions, and allow its
emergence from the institutional, political and
diplomatic isolation imposed by the international
administration of UNMIK, as a result of the
unresolved status. Independence is the only path
for Kosova’s accession to the EU, since the latter
continues to be a union of independent states.
| Independence is the only viable long-term
solution. Any other solution - such as an
autonomous territory within the Union of Serbia
and Montenegro, or independence without
sovereignty’ - remains unacceptable to the kosovar
population, so will not work. The international
community must refrain from treating Kosovaas an
area for institutional and diplomatic
experimentation, as it is doing with UNMIK.
Independent and sovereign states constitute the
only historically viable formula for the
territorial and political organization of Europe.
Kosova’s independence will also create
opportunities for healthy and sustainable
relations between it and Serbia.
| Kosovastill needs support in institution
building, and in monitoring success in the
implementation of minority rights. For this very
reason, we believe that a civil international
presence will be needed in Kosovaeven after status
settlement, albeit of a more limited and speciic
kind than is the case with UNMIK. This implies a
monitoring and supporting presence of the UN, EU,
OSCE and/or Council of Europe, but without
decision-making powers, which should properly
reside with the democratically elected assembly
and government in Prishtina. Kosovastill needs the
military presence of KFOR, for as long as this is
required by the domestic and regional security
circumstances. We make the following
recommendations to kosovar leaders and Western
diplomats for the intermediate period, during the
process of addressing Kosova’s status:
| We recommend that a referendum be held in
Kosova, under UN supervision. We believe that
consulting the political will of the people of
Kosovaon inal status is both necessary and vital
for a sustainable solution.
| We recommend that in the current provisional
period and during the negotiations, the EU should
prepare concrete investment projects to reduce
unemployment and stimulate economic production.
The EU should move from infrastructure assistance
to direct support for the export sector and for
human capacity development, primarily through
investment in education.
| We recommend avoiding any further delay in the
decision-making process leading towards Kosova’s
inal status, in order to prevent an outburst of
accumulated popular dissatisfaction with the
status quo and the grave social and economic
situation. The key risk is that a protracted
process of addressing the status issue could
exacerbate the current situation. Therefore, the
process of status resolution needs to be
relatively quick and must resolve the issue in a
permanent manner.
Notes
(1). We have in mind particularly the Independent
International Group led by former Finnish prime
minister Marti Ahtisaari and former ICTY judge
Richard Goldstone; the International Crisis Group;
the Committee for the Western Balkans led by
former Italian prime minister Giuliano Amato; Noel
Malcolm, Paul Garde, Morton Abramowitz, Janusz
Bugajski; the former foreign minister of Serbia -
Montenegro Goran Svilanovic ; former deputy prime
ministers of Serbia Cedo Jovanovic and Žarko Korac;
former speaker of the Serbian Parliament Nataša
Micic ; and former Serbian Communist leader
Latinka Perovic .
(2). On this issue see Enver Hasani,Self-Determination
Under the Terms of the 2002 Union Agreement
Between Serbia and Montenegro: Tracing the Origins
of Kosova’s Self-Determination’, Chicago-Kent Law
Review, Vol. 80 (2005), pp.305-29.
(3). This was particularly guaranteed by Article
5 of the SFRY Constitution.
(4). For more details see Sabrina Ramet,
Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962 -
1991, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1992.
(5). It should not be forgotten that even during
the period of Kosova’s self-rule, Albanians
continued to provide the bulk of political
prisoners in Yugoslavia. According to estimates of
the time, in the 1970s and 1980s the number of
Albanians imprisoned for political ‘offences’ in
Yugoslavia constituted 90% of the overall number.
(6). On the resistance and mobilization of
Albanians during 1988- 92, see Besnik Pula,
Emergence of the KosovaParallel State, 1988 -
1992’, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32, No. 4
(December 2004), pp.797-826.
(7). ‘Žarko Korac spoke openly about prejudices
in Serbia against Albanians. I want to say openly
that these prejudices are at the limit of racism.’
Latinka Perovic in her book Serbian-Albanian
dialogue 2005: The Future Status of Kosova,
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia,
Belgrade 2005, p.101.
(8). Despite its gestures of reconciliation
toward Croatia and Bosnia, the new regime in
Serbia has not made a single symbolic step to
admit guilt and responsibility for the aggressive
war in Kosova, instead trying to place the blame
for the war on both sides. While KosovaAlbanian
leaders have made denunciatory statements against
the sporadic postwar violence against Serbs in
Kosova, the new regime in Belgrade has thus far
been unwilling to accept responsibility for
Serbia’s aggression against a civilian population.
(9). United Nations Development Programme, Human
Development Report - Kosova2004. http://www.Kosova.undp.org/HDR/hdr.htm.
Resolution of the Assembly of Kosova
source: Assambly of Kosova
* Pursuant to the Card of United Nations
Organization on the right of people for Self-
Determination, as well as based on other
International Acts;
* Taking into consideration the legitimate
aspiration of Kosova Population to leave in
Freedom and peace with other people;
* Based to Historical, Juridical and
Constitutional developments of Kosova Expressed to
the Conference of Bunjajt (1943-44) , to the
Constitutional Declaration of July 2nd , 1990,
based to the Referendum of 1991, as well as to the
Resolution of the Assembly of Kosova on 1991, for
Kosova an Independent and Sovereign State;
* Based to the long war of Kosova People for
Freedom and Independence;
* Based to the general resistance against the
occupation and based as well to the armed war of
Kosova Liberation Army ;
* Confirming the guarantee for protection of
rights for all Communities in Kosova According to
all International Standards;
* Pursuant to the Programs of Political Parties
on Kosova Political Status ;
* Having high estimation for NATO Intervention in
Kosova, to prevent the genocide and ethnic
cleansing exercised by Serbia in Kosova , having
as well high Estimation for International
assistance given to Kosova;
Assembly of Kosova issues the following:
RESOLUTION
ON RICONFIRMATION OF POLITICAL WILL OF Kosova
PEOPLE FOR Kosova AN INDIPENDENT AND SOVREIGN
STATE
1. Assembly of Kosova reconfirms the will of
Kosova people for Kosova an Independent and
Sovereign State;
2. Assembly of Kosova guarantee the
reconfirmation on political will of Kosova people
for Independence, through a referendum
3. Assembly of Kosova takes the obligation to
issue the Constitution in compliance with European
Union standards;
4. Assembly of Kosova requests for International
support of United Nation Organization, Unites
States of America, European Union as well as Other
countries support for Kosova an Independent and
Sovereign State
5. Assembly of Kosova expresses the willingness
to ratify all recognized International Conventions
and Acts on Human and Communities rights, issued
by United Nation Organization, European Union,
European Council and the Organization of Security
and Cooperation in Europe
6. Assembly of Kosova is engaged for respecting
and guaranteeing of human rights and Freedom for
Kosova citizens and guaranteeing of Minority
Community rights in a fully Compliance with
international standards;
7. Assembly of Kosova is engaged for integration
of Kosova into the Euro Atlantic Structures,
welcoms their further engagement on Kosova gives
the commitment for good relations with neighbor
countries contributing to the stability of region
;
8. Assembly of Kosova guarantee the territorial
integrity of Kosova and inviolability of Its
borders
9. Assembly of Kosova confirms that will of
Kosova people for Independence is Nonnegotiable
10. Assembly of Kosova supporting the Delegation
of Kosova , will follow up the all working process
and any decision for the future of Kosova will be
ratified to the Assembly or through the
Referendum;
Such Resolution introduces the legal and
political ground for the Platform of Delegation of
Kosova on the Independence of Kosova. |
